Referentiality in Frege's Grundgesetze by Martin, Edwin Jr
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY O F  LOGIC, 3 (1982), 151-164 
Referentiality in Frege's Grundgesetze 
EDWARD MARTIN Jr. 
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, USA 
Received 30 August 1981 
In $628-31 of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege forwards a demonstration that every correctly 
formed name of his formal language has a reference. Examination of this demonstration, it is here argued, 
reveals an incompleteness in a procedure of contextual definition. At the heart of this incompleteness is a 
difference between Frege's criteria of referentiality and the possession of reference as it is ordinarily 
conceived. This difference relates to the distinction between objectual and substitutional quantification 
and Frege's vacillation between the two. 
1. Introduction 
Frege devotes 8828-31 of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik' to demonstrating 
that every correctly formed name of his formal language has a reference, a deno- 
tation. For Frege a correctly formed name is either a proper name or a function 
name, sentences being a special kind of proper name. Proper names stand for, or 
denote, objects, while function names stand for functions. The most prominent 
objects of the Grundgesetze ontology are truth values (the True and the False) and 
what are roughly set-theoretic constructions (courses-of-values). It is the truth values 
that sentences stand for, and so part of what Frege hopes to show is that each 
sentence of his notation stands for a truth value. Now it is perhaps a small step from 
here to a consistency proof for the logic of the Grundgesetze: if it could be shown that 
the reference of each Basic Law is the True, and that the various rules of inference 
yield only conclusions standing for the True from premisses standing for the True, 
then the logic would be shown to be consistent. 
Of course the logic of the Grundgesetze, as Russell discovered in 1902, is incon- 
sistent. Accordingly, the consistency proof envisioned cannot be carried out. This 
suggests that Frege's demonstration of the referentiality of all correctly formed 
names might be incorrect or incomplete, and that even this goal is unattainable. Close 
examination of Frege's construction, I think, shows an incompleteness in a 
procedure of contextual definition which is also present elsewhere in the Grund- 
gesetze.-Frege fails to notice the incompleteness because of the criteria of referen- 
tiality he gives (§29), and a gulf which exists between satisfaction of these criteria and 
referentiality ordinarily or pretheoretically conceived. This gulf forces Frege to oscil- 
late between objectual and substitutional quantification depending on whether he is 
1 Georg Ohms Verlagsbuchhandlung, Hildsheim, 1966. Originally published in 1893 (Volume I) and 
1903 (Volume 11) by H .  Pohle at Jena. All references and quotations are from the English translation 
by Montgomery Furth, The basic laws of arithmetic (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1964). 
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thinking of it in terms of ordinary reference or in terms of his criteria. It is important 
to recognize that this gulf exists and results in two senses of referentiality. 
2. Syntax and semantics 
The division of correctly formed names into proper names and function names is 
a syntactic division; that is, in terms of this division syntactic relationships and 
properties-like correct formation-are specified. Function names are further distin- 
guished according to  numbers of argument positions and the syntactic type of 
expression appropriate to each position. A function name which takes in its argument 
places proper names is first-level; a function name which takes in its argument places 
first-level function names is second-level; and so on. In terms of these parameters 
every correctly formed name can be assigned a type, and then argument places of 
function names can also be assigned types depending on the type of expression 
appropriate to  the argument place (823). For example, proper names are type 1, first- 
level functions names of one argument position are type 2, and first-level function 
names of two argument positions are type 3. Now a second-level function name of 
one argument position can be correctly completed with a type 2 expression; then, its 
argument position would be of type 2, while the function name itself would be 
assigned type 4. Similarly, if the argument position is correctly filled by a type 3 
expression, then the argument place would be type 3, and the function name would be 
type 5. We summarize the hierarchy in Table 1 .' 
Table 1 
Hierarchy of Expression Types 
Kind of expression 
Type(s) of the expression's 
Expression type argument place(s) 
Proper names 
Level 1, 1 argument place 
Level 1, 2 argument places 
Level 2, 1 argument place 
Level 2, 1 argument place 
Level 1, 3 argument places 
Level 2, 1 argument place 
Level 2, 2 argument places 
Level 2, 2 argument places 
Level 2, 2 argument places 
Level 2, 2 argument places 
Level 2, 2 argument places 
Level 3, 1 argument place 
There are no 
argument places 
I 
1, I 
2 
3 
1,1,1 
6 
292, 
2 3  
2,6 
3.3 
2 A complete table would also include unequal-leveled function names; see 022. 
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The criteria of referentiality Frege gives depend on an expression's type: 
( A ) A first-level function name of one argument place (type 2 expression) has 
reference if the completion of it with any referring proper name (type 1 
expression) is a referring proper name (type 1 expression). 
( B ) A proper name (type I expression) has reference if the completion of any 
referring first-level function name of one argument place (type 2 expres- 
sion) with it is a referring proper name (type 1 expression), and if the filling 
of either argument place of any referring first-level function name of two 
argument places (type 3 expression) with it is a referring first-level function 
name of one argument place (type 2 expression). 
( C ) A first-level function name of two argument places (type 3 expression) has 
reference if the filling of both argument places by referring proper names 
(type 1 expressions) is a referring proper name (type 1 expression). 
( D ) A second-level function name of one argument place whose argument place 
is of type 2 (a type 4 expression) has reference if the completion of it with a 
referring first-level function name of one argument place (type 2 
expression) is a referring proper name (type 1 expression). 
( E ) A third-level function name of one argument place whose argument place is 
of type 4 (a type 17expression) has reference if the completion of it with a 
referring second-level function name of one argument place whose argu- 
ment place is of type 2 (a type 4 expression) is a referring proper name (type 
1 expression). 
In theory these criteria could continue indefinitely; in practice these five clauses 
will be enough. The criteria give the impression of a kind of induction: by starting low 
in the hierarchy with expressions known to have reference, one can show that 
expressions of greater and greater type also have reference. One problem with this is 
the establishment of the base clause of the induction: how do we get those expressions 
initially known to have reference? As we shall see, Frege relies on his informal expla- 
nation of the Grundgesetze formalism to start the induction off, and this is where 
some troubles arise. 
Any correctly formed compound name is ultimately the result of assembling 
primitive, or simple, names according to the syntactic laws of composition. For Frege 
this means that a primitive function name has its argument places filled with the 
appropriate types of expressions. The filling expressions are, in turn, either primitive, 
or compounded from primitive expressions according to syntactic laws. And so on 
back to the simplest compounds of primitive expressions. Now if all of the primitive 
expressions have reference (that is, satisfy the appropriate criteria from (A)-(E), then 
the simplest compounds of these will also have reference, for this is precisely what 
satisfaction of the criteria guarantees. And, again, the simplest compounds of these 
simplest compounds will have reference. And SO on. Consequently, all correctly 
formed compound names will have reference if the primitive names they are 
composed of do. Accordingly, Frege sets out to show that the primitive names are 
referential. 
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There are no simple proper names in the Grundgesetze formalism. There are eight 
simple function names, five of which are first-level. They are, first, 5 = 5, the sign for 
identity. Frege informally explains this by saying that an identity stands for the True 
if the proper names placed in its two argument places stand for the same object; 
otherwise it will stand for the False ($7). Secondly, there is ' t ' ,  the 'horizontal'. 
Informally, this works much like the predicate '5 is the True': when its argument 
placed is filled by a name of the True, the result stands for the True; when it is com- 
pleted with any other proper name the result stands for the False ($5). Thirdly, the 
negation stroke, ' 7 5 '  simply reverses the value gotten from applying the horizontal 
($6). Fourthly, thereis the sign for truth functionalconditionality withantecedent5 and 
consequent 5 : 5 ' .  This stands for false when'c'is replaced with a name of 
'G 
the True and '5 ' is replaced by a name of the False, or by a name of any other object, 
and it will result in a name of the True under any other completions by proper names 
($12). And, finally, there is '\{', which in some respects takes the place of the definite 
article ($1 1). 
There are in addition two simple second-level function names. Frege's notation 
for universal quantification is ' -&- cp (a)'. This will be completed by a first level 
function name of one argument place (a type 2 expression) to yield a proper name- 
' -& @(g)'-which stands for the True 'if the value of the function @({) is the 
True for every argument', and stands for the False otherwise ($8). (There is also the 
third-level function name representing second-order quantification over functions; it 
will be ignored temporarily.) And, secondly, there is the notation for the course-of- 
values of a function, ' €  cp (E)'. Syntacticaly this works jyst like quantification, 
applying to a type 2 expression to yield a proper name, viz. ' E @ (E)'. Rather than 
give an explicit informal characterization of courses-of values, Frege sketches a 
contextual explanation which has two parts: 
9 
(1) ' E @ ( E )  = 6 YJ (E)'  has the same reference as '+@ ( a )  = YJ ( g ) '  
and 
' 6 (I-€ )' stands for the True, 
(2) , 
' E  ( E = ( -,-$+ g = 14))' stands for the False. 
The first of these stipulations is the infamous Basic Law V from which Russell 
derived a contradiction. The stipulations of (2) are designed to bridge the gap 
between courses-of-values and truth values; in particular, they are to enable the 
evaluation of an identity between what is prima facie a course-of values and what is 
prima facie a truth value. With these conditions, says Frege, 'we have determined the 
courses-of-values so far as is here possible' ($10). We will see that these stipulations 
do not provide for the eliminability of courses-of-values abstracts from all sentential 
contexts, however, and so as a contextual definition they are inadequate. 
3. Referentiality 
It follows from theinformal characterizations of the horizontal and of identity that 
-5 is the same function as ( = (5 = 5); consequently, the horizontal will have 
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reference if the identity sign does and so no independent check of the referentiality of 
the horizontal is needed. Since 7 5  has the opposite truth value from -5, the 
negation stroke will have reference if the horizontal does, and so it need not be put to 
an independent check. And since 
-c: is a truth function of two horizontals, it too 
will have reference if the horizontal does and so need not be independently tested. So 
of the five primitive first-level function names, only that for identity and '\5' need be 
checked for referentiality. These will have reference if filling their argument places 
with referring proper names results in referring proper names. In the language of the 
Grundgesetze there are two kinds of proper names: those which prima facie stand for 
truth values, and those which prima facie stand for courses-of-values. By briefly 
appealing to his informal explanations, Frege argues that the sign for identity and '\{' 
result in referring proper names when their argument places are filled with names of 
truth values; it thus remains to consider completions with courses-of-values names. 
Next Frege checks the universal quantifier for referentiality. ' -&- cp (El)' will 
have reference if ' -&- O ( g ) '  has reference whenever '0 (5)' is a referential type 
2 expression (by (D)). But if '0 6)' has reference, then, by criterion (A), '@ (A)' must 
have reference whenever 'A is a referential proper name. Now, says Frege, 'If this is 
the case, then this denotation [O (A)] either always is the True (whatever ' A ' 
denotes), or not always. In the first case ' -@- O ( a )  ' denotes the True, in the 
second the False' (p. 88). 
It is interesting that the reference of a universally quantified sentence is here 
specified in terms of the references of its instantiation instances. The truth conditions 
given here are substitutional rather than those of objectual quantification earlier 
introduced This shift is forced on Frege by the character of his criteria of 
referentiality. Whereas in earlier discussions he talks objectually about function 
names standing for functions and about arguments and values of such functions, the 
criteria (A)-(E) are couched wholly in terms of the referentiality of substitutional 
completions of function names. Nowhere in (A)-(E) is any mention made of 
functions and objects. This seems wrong since it apparently separates referentiality 
from there being a function referred to. I will return to this below. 
Supposing quantification checked, it remains to do two things: (i) check the 
referentiality of first-level function names when they are completed with courses-of- 
values abstracts, and (ii) check that the second-level 'courses-of-values name 
' E  'cp (E)' has reference. To do (ii), that is, to check that ' Ecp (E)' refers, it must be 
shown that if '0 (5)' is, a referential type 2 expressions, then ' E @ (E)'  is referential 
(by (D)). But since ' E O (E)' has the form of a proper name, it will haye reference if 
and only if: if 'Y(5)' is a referential type 2 expression, then 'V(E O (E))' has 
reference, and if 'V (5,c)' is,a referential type 3 expression, then the filling of either of 
its argument places with ' E 2 (E)'  is a referential type 2 expression (by (B)). Thus to 
check the referentiality of ' E cp (E)', it is sufficient to show: 
(3) If '@ (5)' and 'V (5)' are referential, then so is 'V ( &O (E))'. 
3 Compare Frege's Posthumous writings (edited by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach; Uni- 
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979), 154, 213. 
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Note that here it is assumed that '@ (5)' is a type 2 expression while 'V(5)' is either 
a type 2 expression or a type 3 expression; in particular, identity must be among the 
'V(5)'s which are checked. Without loss of generality we can confine our attention to 
'V(5)'s which are primitive since it is these which will provide the simplest com- 
pounds; if this step results in referential names, then successive compoundings will 
also. Now to accomplish (i)we need to show that if 'V(5)' is a primitive first-level 
function name (of type 2 or type 3), then 
(4) If '& a(€)' has reference, then so does 'V( & @ (E))'. 
According to Fregean principles, if an expression lacks reference, then any com- 
pound containing it will also lack refereqce even if it is a correctly formed'name. Thus 
if '@ (5)' lacks reference, so too will ' E @ (E)'; contrapositively, if ' E @ (E)' has 
reference, then so must '0 (5)'. Thus (3) and (4) can both be demonstrated by showing 
(5) If '@(()' has reference, then so does 'V( &@(€))', 
(where '@ (5)' is any type 2 expression and 'V(5)' is any primitive type 2 expression or 
primitive type 3 expression) for the antecedent of (5) is not stronger than the ante- 
cedents of (3) or of (4). It is (5) that Frege attempts to demonstrate. 
Again, of the five primitive first-level function names, only identity and ' \< '  need 
be ch,ecked. To check '/5' it must be shown that if '@ (0' has reference, then so does 
' /( E @(€))' .  Once again Frege relies on his informal explanations, this time the 
o,nes designed,to guarantee the trut) of Basic Law VI: if there is,an object r s,uch that 
E @ (E) is E ( E = r), then /( E @ (E)) is r; otherwise \( E@ (E)) is € @ (E). 
Such explanations assume that the course-of-values abstract is referential, and so 
Frege's claim of referentiality here depends on the prior checking of identity, for this 
is the crucial context for courses-of-values abstracts. 
To check identity we need to think of 'V(5)' in (5) as identity. This involves 
showing that 
is a referential type 2 expression if '@ ([)' is referential. This, in turn, requires that we 
show that 
is a referential proper name when A is replaced by a sentence or other name of a truth 
value, and also that 
is referential if 'O(5)' is. To accomplish this Frege relies on stipulations (1) and (2) 
mentioned above (p. 7). Stipulation (2) reduces anything of form (6) to an identity 
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statement of the form of (7). And then stipulation (I) reduces anything of form (7) to 
a quantificational generalization, and this case has already been handled. Unfortu- 
nately, as mentioned above, stipulation (1) is tantamount to Basic Law V, which was 
subsequently discovered to lead to contradiction. It is later revoked, thus leaving the 
demonstration incomplete. Frege acknowledges this in a letter to Russell, saying that 
'It seems, then,.  . .that my explanations in 931 are not sufficient to ensure that my 
combinations of signs have a meaning in all c a ~ e s ' . ~  
4. Circularity 
As mentioned earlier, Frege's failure here dooms the allied attempt at a 
consistency proof for his logic. One way to view this failure is something like this: As 
is now clear, Frege's attempt to show the referentiality of all sentences of the 
Grundgesetze language relies on the Grundgesetze logic. That is, the checks which are 
made assume that the primitive names have various properties, and these assump- 
tions are reflected in the Basic Laws of the logic. If the logic is inconsistent (as turns 
out to be the case), then the primitive names cannot have the assumed properties, and 
the checks have not been made. Any attempted consistency proof along these lines, 
then, will already assume that the logic is consistent. This is necessary, since, as Godel's 
second theorem shows, any consistency proof for a system as strong as Frege's 
requires a stronger logic than that of the system being considered. So there is no way for 
Frege to avoid this kind of circular dependence. Still, Frege's construction might well 
cause us to wonder about the value of consistency proofs in general, since it shows the 
possibility of 'proving' an inconsistent system consistent using a stronger metalogic. 
A further circularity has been attributed to Frege's demonstration by Charles 
Papons and Christian Thiel.' Parsqns reasons that to show the referentiality of 
' E cp (E)' it must be shown that ' E @ (E) has reference for all referential ' @ (5)' 
(by (D)). But to know if '@ (0' is referential, we need to check if '@(A) refp-s, for all 
referential proper names 'A' (by (A)). But one such 'A' is precisely ' €a(€)' if 
everything goes right., So, concludes Parsons, to know if ' E @ (E ) '  is referential we 
must first know if ' E @ (E)' is referential. What Parsons's line of reasoning shows, 
at best, is that a frontal, straightforward approach to Frege's goal will not work. But, 
of course, this is not the path Frege's own demonstration takes. Consequently 
Parsons's argument does not show Frege's approach to be deficient. To show a 
theorem cannot be proved one way is not to show that it is unprovable. And to show 
that one proof is circular is not to show that all proofs are. 
If we could rely on Basic Law V (or stipulation (I) ) ,  as Frege planned to do, then 
we could indeed show that an arbitrary sentence of the Grundgesetze language is 
referential in the sense of meeting the criteria (A)-(E) that Frege propounds. 
Consider, for example, 
4 Jean van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gddel (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967), 127. 
5 'Frege's theory of number', in Max Black (ed.), Philosophy in America (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1965), 189- 191; Christian Thiel, 'Zur Inkonsistenz der Fregeschen Mengenlehre', in his (ed.), 
Frege und die moderne Grundlagenforschung (Anton Hain, Meisenheim an Glan, 1975), 151 - 158. 
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Since the universal quantifier is known to refer, (8) will have reference if 
is areferential first-level functionname (type2expression) (by (D)); and this will besoif 
has reference whenever 'A' does (by (A)). Now 'A' might stand for a truth value; in 
this case, by stipulation (2), (9) will stand for the same thing as either 
both of which can be shown to have reference by invoking Basic Law V (stipulation 
(1)). And if 'A' is replaced with a smooth breathing courses-of-values abstract, then 
(9) can be shown to be referential directly by appeal to  Basic Law V (stipulation (1)). 
We thus show that (8) is referential by showing that the infinity of sentences of the 
form of (9) all have reference. The question of the referentiality of the sentences of 
the form (9)is, in turn, reduced to the question of the referentiality of certain universally 
quantified sentences, thanks to  Basic Law V. In this way the question of the 
referentialit y of sentences like (8) which contain courses-of-values abstracts reduces to  
the question of the referentiality of certain sentences not containing such abstracts. 
When introducing a function name, Frege's usual practice, as we have seen, is to  
tell us its reference by describing the function it stands for; and the function is 
described as saying what its value is for each possible argument (see $85,  6, 7,  8, 11, 
and 12). This procedure can be viewed as giving an explicit definition of the function 
name. When dealing with the second-level function name for courses-of-values, 
however, Frege departs from this strategy, giving instead what might be thought of as 
a contextual definition ($10). That is, instead of saying outright what courses-of- 
values are, he attempts to  explain the meaning of any larger context containing a 
smooth breathing abstract. He does this by equating such contexts with others 
already understood which do not contain the abstracts. Stipulations (1) and (2) are 
the equations he gives for doing this. Frege is not forced into this policy because the 
courses-of-values abstract is a second-level, type 4 expression. For the universal 
quantifier is of exactly the same syntactic type and yet Frege gives for it (nearly 
enough) an explicit informal account. 
Presumably Frege wants to tell us something enlightening or explanatory about 
courses-of-values just as in the Grundlagen6 he tries to  say something revealing about 
6 Translated by J.L. Austin as The foundations of arithmetic (Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, 1968); original published in 1884 by W. Koebner at Breslau. 
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numbers. ('How, then, are numbers to be given to us, if we cannot have any ideas or 
intuitions of them?') In this respect courses-of-values and numbers have a different 
status from that of truth values, familiarity with which is assumed. Because of his 
desire, Frege is prevented from giving an explicit informal explanation of the smooth 
br~athing courses-of-values abstract, for this could only take the form of saying: 
' E @(€)' stands for the course-of-values of 0 (z). And this is not suitably explana- 
tory; it does not tell us what object that is, or how to 'recognize it again as the same'. 
We have, that is, no suitable independent means of specifying courses-of-values. The 
only alternative, then, seems to be supplying conditions of identity like (1) and (2). 
5. Eliminability 
Notice, however, that stipulations (1) and (2) are not sufficient to provide for the 
elimination of smooth breathing courses-of-values abstracts from all sentences, as 
one might have supposed from the contextual definition procedure. As a 
consequence of this failing, truth conditions have not been assigned to all sentences 
of the Grundgesetze notation. There are at least three contexts in which a course-of- 
values abstract may appear which can not be treated by stipulations (1) and (2). They 
are: (I) identities as in (8) in which the identity sign is flanked by a smooth breathing 
abstract on one side and a variable bound by a quantifier on the other; (11) identities 
as in 
in which the identity sign (here, the left-most) is flanked by a smooth breathing 
abstract on one side and a variable bound by a course-of-values abstract on the other, 
and (111) contexts such as 
in which a smooth breathing abstract appears in the argument place of a function 
variable which is bound by a quantifier. 
Contexts (I) and (11) are obtained by employing Frege's second way of forming a 
name (830) in which a proper name is excluded from a proper name containing it, 
thereby forming a new function name. This syntactic operation is seemingly ignored 
by (A)-(E) as well as in Frege's earlier explanations of the references of his primitive 
names ($55 fa.' Context (111) employs the previously ignored higher level quantifier. 
As is apparent, showing it to be referential involves dealing with courses-of-values 
and so is not 'similar' (as Frege claims) to lower-level quantification. 
One way we might try to treat case (I) is by mimicking the set-theoretic 
equivalence 
7 Compare Edwin Martin, 'A note on  Frege's semantics', Philosophical studies, 25 (1974), 441 -443. 
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in Frege's theory using the relation 5-5 (534). Doing so for (8) yields something like 
The trouble with this as an elimination is that '5-5' is $self a defined expression, one 
whose definition includes a clause of the form 'u = E g ( E ) ' ,  which is just what we 
are trying to eliminate. Consequently, expanding our equivalence into primitive 
terms puts back in the smooth breathing abstract. And were we to count '5-5' as a 
prifnitive and undefined relation word, then we would have the further context 
' E @(E)^y'  from which to eliminate the course-of-values abstract; and this latter 
task seems no easier than our original one. 
Another way we might try to handle case (I) contexts is by equating sentences like 
(8) with the infinite conjunction of all sentences of the form of (9); we could then 
eliminate the abstract by Basic Law V (stipulation (1)). However, this course makes 
quantification into substitutional quantification, rather than the objectual quantifi- 
cation Frege presumably wants. It also drastically changes the language being 
considered, now allowing names of infinite length. Finally, we might treat case (I) by 
invoking two principles Frege holds true: every function has a course-of-values, and 
every object of the Grundgesetze theory is a course-of-values; i.e., 
and 
Given these it seems reasonable that we could replace any expression of the form 
by the equivalent expression 
(8) may thus be converted into 
and thence by Basic Law V into 
which is devoid of smooth breathing abstracts. But some applications of this 
procedure may turn a case (I) problem into a case (11) or case (111) problem. For 
example, 
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will give way to 
which contains a type (11) abstract. And, similarly, 
will be replaced by 
which contains a type (11) appearance of a smooth breathing abstract. Consequently, 
this solution to case (I) problems must rely on solutions to cases (11) and (111). 
Also, a case (11) problem may turn into a case (I) problem as when we use Basic 
Law V to turn (10) into 
*[ a = b. (a = a )  = g (a)], 
and thence into a case (111) problem when we reduce this in turn to 
Consequently, elimination depends on a workable solution to case (111) contexts. 
All that seems possible here is elimination of the bound function variable by con- 
sideration of its instantiation instances, numerous though they are. This route to 
elimination will, as before, make the language infinitistic. Furthermore, some 
perfectly good first-level function names, like 
contain the very same, type (III), context we are trying to eliminate. Thus exami- 
nation of instances will not ultimately lead to  the elimination we are after. 
What seems to be the case, then, is that there are at least three contexts containing 
course-of-values abstracts that we are powerless to explain in already understood 
terms not containing such abstracts. Stipulations (1) and (2) doe not provide 
sufficient means to eliminate all abstracts, nor does a satisfactory emendation seem 
possible. As a consequence, we are left without an explanation of the meanings of 
some of the sentences of the Grundgesetze language. Frege thought that as a result of 
his showing the referentiality of every Grundgesetze name, it had been shown that 
every sentence 'expresses a sense, a thought. Namely, by our stipulations it is deter- 
mined under what conditions the name denotes the True' (pp. 89f). Of course, since 
the proof ultimately fails, this latter contention must be withdrawn, and this is what 
Frege does in his letter to Russell. But the present point is stronger: even had the 
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proof succeeded, even were the Grundgesetze logic consistent, still total elimination 
of courses-of-values abstracts would not be possible. So even allowing Basic Law V, 
the truth conditions of some sentences are not determined. Consider sentence (10) 
once again: under what conditions does it stand for the True? We cannot say, for we 
have been given no general explanation of what courses-of-values are. 
6. Context and reference 
Frege's criteria (A)-(E) are residue from his earlier Grundlagen thesis that it is 
only in the context of a sentence that we should ask after a-word's meaning.' This 
principle suggests the legitimacy of contextual definition, i.e., that a word's meaning 
can be specified by specifying the meanings of all containing sentences. Now identity 
provides a very important kind of containing sentence, both because of the primacy 
of identity as a primitive function name in the Grundgesetze, and because of Frege's 
concern with providing identity conditions. If we want to introduce a type 4 
expression, $ cp (x), then, two important sentence types for which meanings must be 
given will be 
(11) ;@ (x) = ;vJ (x) 
and 
The strategy which Frege adopts with sentences of the form of (1 l), both in the 
case of numbers and of courses-of-values, is to  equate them with some further 
sentence 
involving an already understood type 8expression. In the case of courses-of-values it 
is Basic Law V (stipulation (1)) which plays the role of (13). However, this still leaves 
identities of the form of (12) to deal with, and here two obvious alternatives present 
themselves: 
Alternative 1: Identify h(x) with something handy, something already well 
understood. 
Alternative 2: Identify all of the As with some ,&t~ (x). 
Alternative 1 is the course Frege adopts for numbers, identifying the number of Fs 
(Nx F(x))  with a course-of-values. This is tantamount to  giving an explicit definition 
of the new function name. It reduces questions about meaning for sentences like (1 1) 
8 Compare Michael Dummett, 'Frege, Gottlob', in Encyclopedia of philosophy (ed. Paul Edwards: 
Macmillan, New York, 1967), vol. 2, 233-231. 
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and (12) to  questions about the meanings of identities involving courses-of-values 
abstracts. Alternative 1 thus renders superfluous the prior treatment of sentences of 
the form (11) as sentences like (13). When the definiendum and definiens have 
matching bound variables (as they do in Frege's treatments), eliminability from all 
contexts is guaranteed. 
Now if Frege is to  adopts Alternative 1 also in the case of courses-of-values, he 
will have to have in hand some objects with which courses-of-values can be 
identified. For Frege there is only one kind of object which is so basic: truth values. 
But courses-of-values cannot be identified with truth values because there are very 
many courses-of-values and only two truth values. So here Alternative 2 must be taken. 
This requires that all proper names which are not course-of-values abstracts be equated 
with some name of that form. Then sentences of form (12) will reduce to sentences of 
form (1 l), which reduce to  sentences of form (1 3). Since the only names of this sort in the 
Grundgesetze are names of truth values, it is precisely the stipulations of (2) which 
accomplish this goal. As we have seen, as acontextual definition this fails because there 
are further sentential contexts made up of identity and quantificational resources from 
which the couises-of-values abstract is ineliminable. Frege must have at least dimly 
recognized this ineliminability, for otherwise he should have been prompted to think of 
the course-of-values abstract (like the one for numbers) as a defined symbol rather than 
primitive, and to think of Basic Law V as part of a definition rather than an axiom. 
Notice the situation Frege is in with respect to courses-of-values. If we allow Basic 
Law V, then his referentiality proof succeeds. That is, he can show that every name in 
the Grundgesetze meets conditions (A)-(E); and this is what referentiality has been 
construed to be. Yet even allowing Basic Law V, truth conditions for some of these 
sentences cannot be given. Under Frege's criteria it is possible to show that a sentence 
is referential without being able to state its truth conditions. This is just the situation 
with (10). As a different example, consider a first-level function name '@([)'. 
Suppose we are told the reference of every proper name of the form '@(A)' where 'A' 
is a referential proper name; so, then, we know (by (A)) that '0 (4)' is referential. 
Still, we do not know what function '0 (4)' stands for (if any), but only the values of 
that function for nameable objects as arguments. Consequently we cannot state truth 
conditions for ' @(a)' in terms of the function '@ (t)' stands for, because 
we do not know what function that is. When Frege argues for the referentiality of the 
universal quantifier, therefore, he must do so in terms of the completions of '0 ({)' 
rather than the function '@(()' stands for. Consequently what he can only end up 
showing is that the substitutional quantifier has reference. So although truth 
conditions in this case are stated, they are the wrong ones. 
We might contrast the two conditions under consideration for the case of a first- 
level function name, a type 2 expression. On the one hand, it might satisfy criterion 
(A), and on the other hand it might, intuitively speaking, bear a relation of reference 
to  a function. Prima facie, these conditions are very different. Since Fregean 
functions are defined for all objects as arguments,g satisfaction of criterion (A) is 
9 See P.T. Geach and Max Black (eds.), Translations from thephilosophical writings of Gottlob Frege 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1966), 33-34, 165-166. 
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insufficient to guarantee there is a function referred to. For it might be that although 
all completions of a function name with proper names result in referential proper 
names, still there is no appropriate function whose domain is all objects, the unnamed 
as well as the named. The function has commerce with all objects, while the com- 
pletions encompass only those objects with names. 
We must draw a distinction here if we are to maintain a sense in which 'Everything 
has a name' is false. Still, a comprehensible and in some ways attractive alternative in 
the spirit of much of what Frege says is to think of function names as standing for 
partial functions-functions not defined for every object as argument. If we do this, 
then it is possible for a function name to stand for a (partial) function, but yet not 
satisfy criterion (A). This will happen if the partial function is undefined for some 
nameable arguments. People who hold that sentences like '2 is red' are meaningless 
might well maintain this view: '5 is red' stands for a partial function which is 
undefined for the number 2 as argument. So here there would be a function-a 
partial function-for which the function name stands although the function name 
does not satisfy criterion (A). There seems, then, to be a big difference between the 
two conditions, and this is the gulf earlier mentioned. We have, accordingly, what we 
can think of as two senses of referentiality, the substitutional sense in which criteria 
(A)-(E) are satisfied, and the objectual sense in which an expression bears a certain 
semantic relation to what is usually an extralinguistic entity. 
In spite of this difference between substitutional and objectual reference, some 
people have thought Frege's criteria important. For example, Furth seizes them in an 
attempt to extricate Frege from his problems with 'the concept horse'.'' But substi- 
tutional reference, as a species of reference, is far fetched on the face of it. For, as 
Quine is fond of reminding us, any syntactical class of expression can be thought of 
as referential in this sense. " We might, for example, isolate a syntactic class (typep 
expressions) which includes 'under', 'above', 'beside', 'in', 'on', 'near', etc. A con- 
dition of reference (parallel to (A)-(E)) for an expression of a complementary 
syntactic type-for example, 'John hit Joe 5 the mouth'-would be that every 
completion of it with a referential typep expression results in a referential sentence. It 
seems extremely implausible to say on the basis of this that the containing expression 
stands for some reference, whether it be a function, an object, or something else, for 
in this case there is no reasonable candidate. Substitutional reference is not objectual 
reference. If we think-as Frege sometimes seems to-that function names objectu- 
ally refer to functions, then the problems of attributing or specifying such reference 
cannot be solved in substitutional terms. Rather, an objectual means of referring to 
functions must be found.'* 
10 'Two types of denotation', in Studies in logical theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Mono- 
graph Series, Monograph No. 2; Blackwell, Oxford, 1968), 27-40. 
11 For example, Ontological relativity (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), 105-106. 
12 Compare Edwin Martin, 'Frege's problems with "the concept Horse" ', Critica, 5 ,  No. 15 (1971), pp. 
45-61; and Michael Dummett, Frege:philosophy of language (Harper & Row, New York, 1973), 
212-217. 
